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INTRODUCTION
S imilar to the ways in which countries modify their tax policies to attract foreign investment, states within the U.S. have adopted different tax rules hoping to maintain or expand their economies, even at the expense of other states. These strategies suggest three important policy questions: To what extent do different state tax rules affect state revenue and inbound investment? How do taxpayers respond to differences in state tax rules? How do such differences affect the burden of complying with state taxes? Although existing research addresses the first two questions, it is absent on the last question. 1 Thus, in this paper we aim to understand what factors affect corporations' state income tax compliance costs, and in particular examine the effect of multistate filings on these costs. 2 
Does Disconformity in State Corporate Income Tax Systems affect Compliance Cost Burdens?
Our study is motivated by the longstanding interest of public finance researchers in examining the magnitude and sources of compliance costs. Because simplicity is often viewed as a cornerstone of good tax policy, gaining an understanding of what drives these costs can potentially inform policy-makers about areas to target for reducing such costs. The current debate on Internet taxation has provided an impetus for state governments to discuss increasing uniformity in sales and use taxes.
3 Should these talks proceed to a broader discussion of state corporate income taxes, our findings suggest that uniformity among the states could generate substantial compliance cost savings. 4 This study's focus on corporate income taxes at the state level differs from prior research that has examined compliance costs of individual and corporate income taxes at the federal level. 5 State income taxes have begun to play an increasingly important role in the current business environment, especially in view of the reduced federal support of the states. To make up some of that ground, state and local governments appear to have become more active in raising revenue. On one hand, states are differentiating their tax laws and burdens from those of other states in an effort to retain existing businesses and to attract new ones. There is a downside to this differentiation in that it causes greater variation among state tax laws, which we suggest increases the costs of complying with those laws. On the other hand, state revenue agencies also appear to be enforcing their existing laws more rigorously in an aggressive effort to pursue revenue collection. 6 At the same time, however, taxpayers have also begun to pay greater attention to their state and local tax burdens, partly due to the states' activism and partly because of perceptions that payoffs to state tax planning could be significant. 7 Apart from these environmental motivations, Wilson's (1999) review of the tax competition literature generally calls for "more work on the potentially important trade-offs between the good and bad aspects of intergovernmental competition." By measuring the deadweight cost of complying with competitive nonconforming state tax rules, we contribute to understanding these trade-offs. Thus, our examination of the determinants of firms' compliance costs for state corporate income taxes should be of topical interest to state tax administrations, the tax profession, and the business community.
This study uses confidential survey data obtained by Slemrod and Blumenthal (1993) and Slemrod (1997) directly from large firms included in the IRS's Coordinated Industry Cases program. Slemrod and Blumenthal (1996) describe these data 3 See, for example, Caffrey (2001) and Gold (2001) . 4 As discussed more fully later, state corporate income tax regimes currently differ significantly from each other on numerous dimensions, not only in the tax rates but also in how the tax base is defined and various procedural matters. 5 For studies of individual income tax compliance costs, see Slemrod and Sorum (1984) and Blumenthal and Slemrod (1992) . For studies of the compliance costs of corporate federal income taxes see Sandford (1973) , Slemrod and Blumenthal (1996) , and Mills, Erickson, and Maydew (1998) . 6 See, for example, Deloitte and Touche's website advertising their firm's tax services http://www.deloitte. com/ vs/0,1151,sid=2158,00.html (2002) . 7 An indication of the growing investments in state and local tax planning is the remarkable increase in the revenues of the then Big-5 accounting firms' state and local tax practices throughout the 1990s. For example, KPMG notes that its state and local tax practice revenues grew 1000 percent from [1995] [1996] [1997] [1998] [1999] [2000] . See the KPMG web site http://www.us.kpmg.com/salt/people/home.html (June 21, 2000) . Although we do not have similar statistics from the other Big-5 firms, conversations with partners at these firms confirmed that state and local tax practices were the fastest source of revenue growth. Further confirming that the demand for state and local tax planning has grown large is the creation of consulting organizations dedicated solely to state and local tax consulting. See, for example, the SALT Group, http://www.thesaltgroup.com/default.shtml.
in detail and use them to study total compliance costs of big business, as opposed to our focus on the costs of complying with state-level income taxes by corporations. To accomplish our objective, we augment the survey data with data for the same firms from publicly available financial statements. We expect that, controlling for the size of the firm and certain observable sources of disconformity, compliance costs increase in the number of states in which a firm does business and in the total number of legal entities in the taxpaying group. Our sample indicates that state tax compliance costs for the largest 1,000 public firms range from $290 to $335 million in the aggregate, compared with about $900 to $1,130 million for federal compliance costs. On a relative basis, state compliance costs are about 2.9 percent of the current state income tax expense of these corporations, or about twice the relative federal compliance cost burden of 1.4 percent of current federal income tax expense. Consistent with expectations, we find that state compliance costs indeed increase in the number of states in which a firm files state income tax returns and in the number of entities, even after controlling for firm size and various firm-specific variables proxying for state tax complexity. Alternatively, this result holds for the number of state tax returns filed. We believe that these results provide evidence that disconformity in state corporate tax regimes increases compliance cost burdens. These results, together with the recent evidence on the labor, investment, and revenue effects of state corporate income tax rules and the theoretical work on tax competition, further reinforce the notion that competition among the states, unlike competition among firms, is welfare-reducing rather than welfare-enhancing.
This paper proceeds as follows: we first review the institutional background of multistate taxation to develop hypotheses. We then describe the data and empirical procedures, present the results, and conclude with implications and limitations.
INSTITUTIONAL BACKGROUND AND HYPOTHESIS DEVELOPMENT
Currently, 45 states plus Washington D.C. impose a state corporate income tax.
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These states' corporate income tax systems vary widely in many respects. To develop formal predictions, we describe briefly in this section the principal sources of disconformity between states' corporate income tax regimes. We first discuss the general causes of disconformity and their impact on compliance costs, and then identify some specific sources of disconformity and their likely impact on compliance costs. 
Allocation and Apportionment
A multistate corporation that does business in multiple states is required to divide its income among those states. Under the Uniform Division of Income for Tax Purposes Act (UDITPA) adopted by most states, a corporation must separate its income into business income, which is apportioned among the various states, and nonbusiness income, which is allocated to a single state. Although, historically, states have used a three-factor formula for apportioning business income based on sales (or receipts), property, and payroll, states differ in the weight placed on each factor and how the factors are defined. Originally, most states weighted the three factors equally, but only 14 states still do so, with 22 states currently doubleweighting the sales factor and four states placing an even greater weight on the sales factor. 10 Further, while sales typically are assigned to a particular state based on a destination test, some states use a "throwback rule" that reassigns sales to the state of origin if the corporation is not taxable in the destination state.
Reporting and Filing Procedures
States also differ in their reporting and filing procedures that determine which corporations must file a return and which related entities must/can file together or separately. In particular, 25 states require or allow "unitary" (or combined) reporting, 11 whereas 22 states require or allow "separate reporting" by each entity within an affiliated group. States mandating unitary (combined) reporting do so by requiring a company to file a combined return with all of its affiliates that form a unitary group. This allows the state to apply its apportionment formula to the combined income of a related group of corporations, even though some of the entities in the group might not otherwise be taxable in the state. On the other hand, non-unitary (separate reporting) states require each entity conducting business within the state to file a separate return. Even among the states that follow combined reporting, differences exist on the level of combination.
Definition of the Tax Base
Finally, states also differ in their definitions of the tax base, beginning with the starting point for calculating taxable income (while most states use the federal taxable income as the starting point, five states do not), to what items of income and deductions are included in taxable income. 12 We discuss some of the main differences in the next section.
The general areas of disconformity described above should increase overall compliance costs as the firm has to file in 10 See CCH Tax Research NetWork web site: http://tax.cchgroup.com/primesrc/bin/highwire.dll (2/12/02).
As a further complication, states define the factors differently from one another. For example, Delaware excludes officers' compensation from the payroll factor, and California uses original cost while New Jersey uses net book value in determining the Property factor. 11 Generally, entities are considered unitary if they are functionally related, have centralized management, and benefit from economies of scale. However, case law largely shapes the unitary business principle and states differ in how they operationalize this concept. The U.S. Supreme Court has itself recognized that there are many variations of this principle specifically stating that "the unitary business concept … is not unitary" (Container Corp. of America v. Franchise Tax Board, 463 U.S. 159, 103 S.Ct. 2933 [1983 more different states and has more entities. Not only does the disconformity in state tax laws generate higher compliance costs because tax return preparation becomes more complex, but the disconformity provides incentives for firms to invest in more tax planning. Consistent with this reasoning, Gupta and Mills (2002) find that state effective tax rates are related to the number of states in which a firm files a state income tax return. The burden first decreases in the number of states at a decreasing rate, then increases at an increasing rate. Based on their evidence and the institutional background presented above, we expect compliance costs to generally increase in the number of states and entities (or state filings) due to both compliance complexity and planning opportunities. Finding that disconformity increases compliance costs should not imply that all corporations would prefer a full-conformity regime, however, because some of the disconformity is undoubtedly lobbied-for, such as doubleweighting of the sales factor being preferred by home-state manufacturers. However, much disconformity likely arises due to the random effect of having multiple legislative bodies and tax administrations. The frequent mention of state disconformity contributing to higher compliance costs, discussed in our conclusion, suggests that there are net welfare losses due to compliance burdens.
Multistate DisconformitySpecific Effects
Apart from the general differences in states' tax systems described above, multistate corporations' compliance costs are also likely to be impacted by the composition of their assets and other operational characteristics for the reasons explained below. Although the sources of disconformity are many, we limit the discussion below to some of the more important and well-known issues for which we are able to propose specific explanatory variables in our empirical tests.
Depreciation
Manufacturing firms that typically have more depreciable fixed assets (property, plant, and equipment) have to contend with numerous differences in states' depreciation policies. Only 26 states use federal depreciation rules. The other states differ from federal statutes in various ways, including differences in bases of the property, disallowance of Accelerated Cost Recovery System (ACRS) and/or Modified Accelerated Cost Recovery System (MACRS) or other methods of accelerated depreciation, disallowance of optional federal deductions, use of investment tax credits in lieu of depreciation, and different treatments of in-state and out-of-state assets. Because the depreciation rules are complex and vary widely, we expect that firms with higher depreciable assets will have higher state income tax compliance costs. Multinationality U.S. firms with international operations face significant complexity and confusion associated with state-by-state differences in their treatment of foreign income. Specifically, states vary on the definition and treatment of types of income (e.g., dividends, royalties, interest, sales, and operating), and of foreign expenses and deductions. Treatment of repatriations of foreign income also differs on a state-by-state basis. Some states (e.g., Arizona) exclude dividends received from foreign corporations, while others (e.g., Colorado) do not, and some states provide partial exclusion based on the degree of affiliation. Because of these differences, we expect that state compliance costs are higher when foreign assets are higher.
Intangible Assets
Firms with income-generating intangible assets have available to them significant incentives for state tax planning. These incentives arise from a combination of ap-portionment formula and tax rate differences together with the combined versus separate reporting rules. The tax planning involves transferring brands or patents to an affiliate in a low-taxed separate filing state, and charging royalties to operating entities in higher-taxed states. The royalty payment reduces taxable income in the high-taxed state and transfers this income to the low-taxed state. As a result, we expect that firms with higher intangible assets will have higher compliance costs due to the tax-motivated planning for royalties.
Net Operating Losses
While most states permit a deduction for net operating losses (NOLs), they vary in the specific amount of the deduction and particularly in their rules relating to the carryback and carryforward periods. These differences should increase compliance costs. 13 Arguably, however, the presence of an NOL also indicates poor performance, which increases the incentives to save money. Further, because the NOL we observe proxies for a federal tax loss carryforward and thus a lower marginal tax rate (see Mills, Newberry, and Novack, 2003) , the incentives for tax planning are less important for firms with NOLs. For both reasons, firms with NOLs could have lower compliance costs.
To summarize the above discussion, we hypothesize that, all else equal, corporations' state income tax compliance costs are positively related to factors that represent reporting complexity or planning incentives. Specifically, we predict that if multistate disconformity imposes higher compliance costs, then firms' compliance cost burdens will increase in the number of states in which they do business after controlling for 1) the total number of legal entities, 2) the amount of their depreciable assets, 3) the amount of their foreign assets, 4) the amount of their intangible assets, and 5) the presence of net operating losses.
DATA, SAMPLE AND DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS Survey Data and Sample
We obtain data on corporations' state income tax compliance costs from Slemrod and Blumenthal's (1993) and Slemrod's (1997) 15 With regard to the relevant questions for this study, the 1996 survey has the same format and questions as the 1992 survey. While we reference the authors' reports to the Internal Revenue Service, Slemrod and Blumenthal (1996) provide the most readily accessible discussion of the survey methods and limitations. One limitation in particular is noteworthy. Although we use the partition between state/local and federal compliance costs reported in the survey to examine our research question, we acknowledge that in many corporate tax departments personnel have responsibility for both levels of taxation. Thus, the survey responses could reflect a best estimate approach by the survey respondent, likely the corporate tax director. However, our robustness tests show state tax compliance costs are not fully explained by federal tax compliance costs, indicating that survey respondents are not allocating a constant proportion of total costs to state/local versus federal functions. Slemrod and Blumenthal (1996) and are used in this study with their permission. To preserve confidentiality of the respondents, all data are presented in aggregate and no individual firm is identified.
We first restricted the original sample of 674 firm responses in the survey to 303 firms with requisite compliance cost data from the survey (specifically, total state and local income tax compliance costs, number of states, and the number of state income tax returns filed) and financial statement data from Compustat (specifically, pretax income, sales, and property, plant and equipment). In the regression models estimated later, we deleted eight outliers. Thus the final sample consists of 295 firm-year observations, of which 161 are from the 1992 survey and 134 are from the 1996 survey, and 33 firms are in the sample in both years. Slemrod and Blumenthal (1996) discuss the representativeness of the sample firms with big business in general and the CIC population in particular. They compare the distribution of the survey respondents by principal industry and size, to a description of the 1988 CIC population by the GAO (1992). They provide reasonable explanations for differences in size, and conclude that the respondents are fairly representative of the CIC population, which represents both large firms and also those with complex returns. However, they find that the respondent firms do not represent the top 500, 1,000 or 5,000 companies in the United States.
We examined the industry distribution of the final sample. The respondents are predominantly in three broad industry categories: SIC 2 (nondurable manufacturing-food, paper, textiles), SIC 3 (durable manufacturing-iron & steel, machinery, autos), and SIC 5 (trade). The industry composition is distributed similarly to the largest 1,000 Compustat firms (sorted by 1995 sales), although there are somewhat more electronics manufacturing firms on Compustat (SIC3) than in our final sample after all the data limitations. This distribution, combined with Slemrod's (1997) evaluation of the generalizability of the respondent sample to the CIC population, leads us to conclude that there is no reason to suspect unusual sample selection bias in the survey. Table 1 presents descriptive statistics for the sample, converting 1995 dollar amounts to 1991 dollars using the producer price index. We present all results in the aggregate to protect the confidentiality of these data. We first show in Panel A total unscaled and scaled (by sales) state and federal compliance costs and the distribution of these costs across quartiles of various firm characteristics. These costs consist of amounts spent on tax department salaries and payments for outside consulting assistance. On average, the sample firms spend $258,000 on state compliance costs and $840,000 on federal compliance costs.
Descriptive Statistics on Compliance Costs and Other Firm Characteristics
To get a sense of the magnitude of the total state corporate compliance costs, we compare our sample firms to the largest 1,000 firms on Compustat in 1995 (sorted by sales, Compustat item # 12) that report both current federal income tax expense (item #63) and current state income tax expense (item #173). 16 Using only firms with sales effectively screens out financial services firms as does our sample. For these 1,000 firms, current state income tax expense is $11,474 million, current federal income tax expense is $80,555 million, and sales are $4,223,320 million in the aggregate. For the 251 firms in our sample that report tax expense and sales, the aggregate (mean) current state tax expense is $2,333 million ($9.29 million), current federal tax expense is $16,305 million ($64.96 million), and sales are $990,951 million ($3,948.01 million). Since state compliance costs for these 251 firms are $68 million ($0.271 million) in the aggregate (mean), the percent of state compliance costs to current state income tax expense is 2.9 percent ($68/$2333). Applying this percentage to the state compliance costs for the top 1,000 firms in Compustat puts their aggregate compliance costs at approximately $334 million based on current state tax expense ($11,474*$68/$2,333). Similarly, we estimate their aggregate compliance costs to be $290 million based on sales ($4,223,320*$68/$990,951). The counterpart calculations from federal compliance costs of $228 million for the 251 sample firms yields the percent of these costs to federal tax expense at 1.4 percent ($228/$16,305). Similar calculations for the 1,000 firms would put their total federal compliance costs at approximately $1,125 million based on current federal tax expense ($80,555 * $228/ $16,305) or $972 million based on sales ($4,223,320*$228/$990,951).
On a relative basis, the ratio of state compliance costs to current state income tax expense of 2.9 percent is more than twice that of the ratio of federal compliance costs to current federal income tax expense at 1.4 percent. The higher ratio of state compliance costs provides prima facie evidence of the impact of disconformity in state tax rules. We note that these ratios are about half of Slemrod and Blumenthal's estimates (5.6 percent state and 3.2 percent federal) because we only included the in-house tax department personnel costs plus the outside consulting fees in our measure of compliance costs. We excluded other compliance cost categories such as computer costs and non-tax department personnel costs because these are more frequently missing, but we were unwilling to assume they were zero. These excluded costs equal up to one-half of the total compliance costs (Slemrod and Blumenthal, 1996, Table 2 ), explaining the differences between that study and this one.
Panel A shows that the unscaled state and federal compliance costs increase in the number of states, the number of entities, the number of state returns filed and firm size (sales). However, the scaled compliance costs decrease as these measures increase, consistent with economies of scale in all of these variables except states. The scaled compliance costs first increase from the first to second quartile in the number of states, and then decrease. Our multiple regression will allow us to consider the effect of states and entities controlling for scale effects. We also note that firms with an NOL appear to spend less in unscaled compliance costs, but more in scaled costs. Finally, we note that natural resource firms (mining and oil and gas) incur higher state tax compliance costs than other industries, and trade firms incur lower costs, consistent with Slemrod and Blumenthal (1996) .
In Panel B of In terms of financial attributes, our sample firms' Sales average $3,467 million, ForeignAsset averages $518 million, and Property (net property, plant and equipment) averages $1,712 million. About 14 percent of the sample reports a NOL carryforward.
Measuring intangible assets from publicly available data is problematic. Although patents, trade names, and copyrights are some of the typical income-producing intangibles, data on these assets generally are not available. In contrast, many firms do disclose their spending on R&D and advertising expenses and such expenses often generate licensing fees and royalty income and are considered to be two of the key drivers of the intangible capital of a firm. However, under financial accounting rules, U.S. firms are required to write-off the entire amount of these expenses as incurred; hence the asset value associated with these expenses is not available. Thus, we use the sum of these two expenses (R&D+Advertise) as our intangibles proxy. R&D+Advertise for our sample firms average $120 million, although over a quarter of the firms do not report any amount and for them the variable is coded zero, which skews the distribution. Table 2 reports pairwise correlations among the state and financial variables. As expected, state compliance costs are positively related to the number of States (ρ = 43 percent), the number of Entities (ρ = 52 percent), and to StateReturns (ρ = 42 percent). States is correlated with both Entities and StateReturns.
RESULTS

Univariate Tests
The correlations also show that state compliance costs grow as the firms have higher foreign assets (ρ = 52 percent), depreciable property (ρ = 53 percent), intangible activity (ρ = 27 percent) and sales (ρ = 52 percent). While all of these univariate relationships are consistent with the added complexity associated with the underlying firm-specific characteristics, they also reflect the firm size effect on compliance costs. Our multivariate tests to follow will investigate the incremental effect of each complexity variable controlling for firm size. There is no apparent relation between compliance costs and the presence of net operating losses, providing no univariate evidence that tax status motivates state income tax compliance costs.
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State and federal compliance cost spending are correlated with ρ = 75 percent, indicating that although many size or complexity factors similarly affect state and federal compliance costs, other factors beyond federal spending will explain variation in state spending. Given the high correlation, however, it may be difficult to identify the separate effects of state spending were we to include federal cost in our multivariate tests. Thus, we will use federal costs for sensitivity purposes only.
Multivariate Tests
To examine the partial effect of the factors associated with state tax compliance costs, we estimate multiple regression models. We model expenditures on state income tax compliance as a function of the several firm-specific attributes that, as discussed earlier, we expect specifically related to state spending. We specify the regression using logs of all the continuous variables.
We initially estimate the model using only the state-specific variables (States, Entities, dummies for operating in California or New York, Sales, and dummies for the natural resource and trade industry groups), but without other operating complexity factors to provide a benchmark magnitude for the compliance cost associated with doing business in another state: We then augment the model to add other firm-specific factors (ForeignAssets, Property, R&D+Advertise, and NOL) that we expect are related to state tax disconformity as follows: StateCost is total state income tax compliance costs, consisting of both inhouse tax department personnel costs and outside consulting costs from the survey; StateCost is state income tax compliance costs, consisting of both in-house tax department personnel costs and outside consulting costs, but excluding nonpersonnel costs and personnel costs within the firm but outside the tax department. States is the number of states in which the firm files a tax return. Entities is the number of active legal entities. StateReturns is the total number of state income tax returns that the firm files. This variable is less than the maximum of States times Entities, because many states permit combined filing. ForeignAssets are total foreign assets from the compliance cost survey. Property is net property, plant and equipment, Compustat item #8. R&D is research and development expense, Compustat item #46 where available, zero otherwise. Advertise is advertising expense, Compustat item #45 where available, zero otherwise. Sales is Compustat item #12. NOL is a dummy variable coded 1 if Compustat item #52 >0, zero otherwise. FederalCost is federal income tax compliance costs, consisting of both in-house tax department personnel costs and outside consulting costs, but excluding nonpersonnel costs and personnel costs within the firm but outside the tax department. All financial variables are reported in millions of dollars. ***significant at < 0.001.
States is the number of states in which the firm files a tax return from the survey; Entities is the total number of legal entities in the firm; CA is a dummy variable that equals one if the firm files in California, zero otherwise; NY is a dummy variable that equals one if the firm files in New York, zero otherwise; ForeignAssets is total foreign assets from the survey; Property is net property, plant and equipment from Compustat (item #8); R&D is research and development expense from Compustat (item #46 where available, zero otherwise); Advertise is advertising expense from Compustat (item #45 where available, zero otherwise); NOL is a dummy variable for net operating loss from Compustat (equals 1 if item # 52 is greater than zero, and zero otherwise); Sales is net sales from Compustat (item #12); NAT_RES is a dummy variable that equals one if the firm is in the natural resources industry, zero otherwise; TRADE is a dummy variable that equals one if the firm is in the wholesale or retail trade industry, zero otherwise; and D1995 is a dummy variable that equals one if the observation is in 1995, zero otherwise (1991).
We predict that both States and Entities will be positively related to StateCost, because these variables reflect both complexity and planning opportunities. In alternative specifications (models 3 and 4), we use the total number of state tax returns (StateReturns), instead of States and Entities, to reflect the joint effect of filing multiple entities' returns in multiple states. We expect StateReturns to also be positively related to StateCost.
Following Slemrod and Blumenthal (1996) , we include specific dummy variables for filing in California or New York, expecting that compliance costs are higher for filing in these states that have complex laws and vigorous enforcement.
Given the structure of state tax systems described earlier, we expect that compliance costs increase in foreign assets, depreciable property, and R&D and advertising expenses. Further, we expect that NOL status will be negatively related to tax compliance costs if firms with lower tax incentives decrease their spending on tax planning, but positively related to such costs if differences in state rules are onerous.
Finally, we include other control variables-firm size, industry dummies, and a year dummy. We expect state compliance costs increase as the firm grows larger and should account for scale effects. Following Slemrod and Blumenthal (1996) , we include two industry dummy variables, expecting that compliance costs are higher for natural resources firms and lower for wholesale or retail trade firms. Because our sample spans data from two years, 1995 and 1991, we also include a dummy variable for any unspecified year-specific macroeconomic effects. Table 3 presents the main results of estimating equations [1] and [2] and their counterpart models with the number of state tax returns. The first row reports the coefficient estimate and the second row reports the associated Huber-White t-statistic in parentheses that are computed with the standard errors corrected for both heteroskedasticity and serial correlation. Because the regression is specified in levels of spending on state tax compliance and the control variables, we need to account for potential heteroskedasticity. In addition, since there are 36 firms in the sample in both years, we need to correct the standard errors for any lack of independence among the observations. The sample consists of firms from Slemrod and Blumenthal's (1993) and Slemrod's (1997) surveys of large corporations' compliance costs, where the sample is restricted to firms that report state compliance costs and can be matched to Compustat data. Eight observations where the abs(rstudent)<3 were deleted. *, **, *** p-value < 0.10, 0.05, 0.01 respectively in two-tailed tests. The Huber-White t-statistics are calculated using the Stata statistical package. An econometric adjustment using a cluster option by firm produces correct standard errors even if the observations are correlated and heteroskedastic (see StataCorp, 1999, p. 257) .
Ln(States)
Ln ( th percentile of all the sample variables. Consistent with the expected economies of scale that is captured by our log specification, we observe that the state compliance costs increase at a decreasing rate. For example, the effect of adding one State plus one Entity is $8,000 at the first quartile, $4,500 at the second quartile, and $2,800 at the third quartile. Similarly, the effect of adding one StateReturn is $1,900 at the first quartile, $1,000 at the second quartile, and only $400 at the third quartile.
It is difficult to assess whether this estimated cost effect is high in absolute terms for a large firm. However, the survey evidence continues to identify state disconformity (federal versus state, and among states) as a major source of corporate compliance costs. Slemrod and Venkatesh (2002) state that:
"by a small amount, taxpayers selected the establishment of complete uniformity among state and local corporate income tax rules and conformity to federal rules as the most likely to simplify tax compliance … The survey also asked … whether a company might have otherwise undertaken a business activity, but did not because of the tax complexity involved. Firms were given eight choices and the option of saying that [there] were no such activities. ... 72.9 percent of taxpayers were not aware of any activity not undertaken because of tax complexity. Of the remainder who were aware of activities foregone, the top three mentioned were expanding operations into other states (10.4 percent), establishing a foreign subsidiary or branch (8.9 percent) and restructuring executive compensation (8.3 percent)" (quoted by permission; emphasis supplied).
Panels A and C of Table 3 only include general control variables for total compliance costs, including size, industry and the year dummy. As expected, state compliance costs increase in size, and natural resources firms have higher costs than average, and wholesale or retail trade firms have lower costs than average. The year dummy is never significant. Panels B and D of Table 3 add specific state-related variables to the state filing variables and controls. Although neither dummy variable for filing in California or New York is significant, the coefficient on number of States decreases. Firms that file in California or New York file in more states than do firms that do not file in California or New York.
19 Although Slemrod and Blumenthal (1996) found that total compliance costs were higher for firms filing in California, we suggest that this result could instead be due to the number of states in which the taxpayer files.
Foreign assets and depreciable property are associated with higher state tax compliance costs, as expected. The effect of Sales is attenuated by collinearity with both of these variables because firms with high foreign assets and depreciable property will also have high sales. Neither R&D+Advertise nor NOL is related to state compliance costs.
Sensitivity Tests and Limitations
It is possible that much of the variation in spending on state tax compliance is due to firm-specific factors we have not identified, including preferences for tax aggressiveness. Hence, we re-estimate our regressions including sample firms' spending for federal tax compliance (FederalCost), which we expect will account for many such unobserved preferences. As expected, the intercept decreases (to about -0.15) and the R-squared increases (to about 70 percent) across the four models. The main variables of interest, States, Entities, and StateReturns, remain significant in the parsimonious models (Panels A and C). However, States becomes insignificant with the addition of other variables in Panel B, and StateReturns becomes insignificant in Panel D. In these models, the dummy variable for California (CA) becomes positive and significant for the first time. Including FederalCost causes nearly all other variables to become insignificant, including ForeignAssets and Property. These effects, combined with smaller coefficients on the state filing variables, lead us to view the FederalCost supplemental test as interesting, but distracting. Although it clearly shows that state compliance costs are related to federal costs, this specification prevents readers from understanding what specific firm-level characteristics contribute to state compliance costs.
To further evaluate the sensitivity of our regression results, we also used alternate model specifications. In particular, we re-estimated Table 3 's regressions in levels, rather than logs. In this specification, we continue to find either that States and Entities both increase state compliance costs (Panels A and B) or that StateReturns increase such costs (Panels C and D).
We explore adding interactive effects between the state compliance cost variables and the various firm-level characteristics to the linear regression. For simplicity, we use the StateReturns regression (rather than the regressions with both States and Entities) to minimize the number of interaction variables. We begin by adding the interaction between StateReturns and Property, which is the explanatory variable with the most compelling potential interaction based on ex ante arguments. The interaction term for StateReturns*Property and the main effect for StateReturns are significantly positive, but the main effect for Property becomes insignificant. As we add more interaction terms, the power decreases because the correlation among the interaction terms increases. For example, the correlation between StateReturns*ForeignAsset and StateReturns*Sales is ρ = 85 percent. Thus, we conclude that we have too much collinearity or too small a sample to estimate a full main effects and interaction effects model in a linear specification. We find similar limitations when we explore adding interaction terms to the original log specification.
As with any study that uses survey data, our results are limited by potential self-selection of the survey respondents, measurement error associated with selfreported data, and non-response bias. We also acknowledge that although the sample represents large, complex firms, we cannot generalize these results to a wide population of either smaller or less complex firms.
CONCLUSIONS
As state and local income taxes assume increasing prominence in large corporations' expenses of doing business in the United States, it is important to understand what factors contribute to the costs of complying with these taxes. We use survey data from Slemrod and Blumenthal (1993) and Slemrod (1997) to investigate the state and local component of compliance costs.
When the tax directors of responding corporations were asked for suggestions for simplifying federal or state compliance, they most frequently (75 of 256 responses) suggested requiring conformity between the state and federal income tax systems, and uniformity among state systems. Nineteen respondents recommended a complete piggyback whereby the federal government should define (and enforce) taxable income and collect and remit tax to the states at each state's tax rate. Twenty-seven respondents recommended requiring uniformity of states' apportionment formula (Slemrod and Blumenthal, 1993, p. 10) . These sentiments were repeated by respondents to Slemrod and Venkatesh's (2002) survey of large and mid-sized businesses.
Corroborating these concerns, we find that nonuniformity among the states indeed increases corporations' compliance cost burdens. We reach this conclusion on the basis of our two main results. First, in terms of magnitude, we estimate that income tax compliance for large firms is about twice as costly (as a percentage of their income tax expense) at the state level than at the federal level, which provides prima facie evidence that nonuniformity is costly. Second, in regression models we find that such costs increase in the number of states in which a firm does business and the number of entities. Alternatively, this result holds for the number of state tax returns filed. The model includes several firm-specific control variables including industry membership, asset composition, and operational characteristics that capture important sources of disconformity among state tax regimes. We conclude from these results that state income tax compliance costs are largely driven by complexity and disconformity.
This finding is consistent with corporate tax directors' suggestions that the most important simplification would be more uniformity. Combining our results with the recent evidence on the labor, investment, and revenue effects of state corporate income tax rules reinforces the notion that competition among the states, unlike competition among firms, is welfare-reducing rather than welfare-enhancing.
